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For medical humanitarian organizations, making their sources of legitimacy explicit is a useful exercise, in
response to: misperceptions, concerns over the ‘humanitarian space’, controversies about speciﬁc humanitarian
actions, challenges about resources allocation and moral suffering among humanitarian workers. This is also a
difﬁcult exercise, where normative criteria such as international law or humanitarian principles are often mis-
represented as primary sources of legitimacy. This essay ﬁrst argues for a morally principled deﬁnition of
humanitarian medicine, based on the selﬂess intention of individual humanitarian actors. Taking Me ´decins
Sans Frontie `res (MSF) as a case in point, a common source of moral legitimacy for medical humanitarian
organizations is their cosmopolitan appeal to distributive justice and collective responsibility. More informally,
their legitimacy is grounded in the rightfulness of speciﬁc actions and choices. This implies a constant commit-
ment to publicity and accountability. Legitimacy is also generated by tangible support from the public to
individual organizations, by commitments to professional integrity, and by academic alliances to support
evidence-based practice and operational research.
Introduction
Humanitarian action is a prominent part of the political
and moral landscape of this 21st century. It has been a
source of relief for innumerable people, and an essential
expression of cosmopolitan solidarity. At the same time,
it is a versatile concept, including Northern/Western
expressions of mainstream humanitarianism, which
encompass an ideology, a profession and a movement
(Donini,2010).Humanitarianismhasbeencriticizedon
all these accounts (Pfeifer, 2004; Barnett and Weiss,
2008).Criticsandanalystsincludescholarsfromvarious
disciplines, such as political sciences, sociology and an-
thropology. Their reservations relate to the three broad
categories of arguments: humanitarian actions them-
selves, political linkages (De Waal, 1997) and media
representations (Hours, 1998a; Boltanski, 2000).
The ﬁrst problem compounding these debates is the
difﬁculty to set up boundaries to the sprawling constel-
lation of occasional initiatives, structured enterprises or
established organizations that make up the humanitar-
ian movement. Expanding from a typology proposed by
Stoddard (2003), Donini (2010) maps humanitarian or-
ganizations of Western origin between four broad cate-
gories of allegiances: the Dunantist tradition of the Red
Cross movement, the Wilsonian tradition of pragmatic
alignment with foreign policies, faith-based organiza-
tions and the ‘solidarist’ communities typically gather-
ing around the banner of human rights. Importantly,
these categories overlap to a great extent, and they do
not necessarily include less visible but equally important
forms of humanitarian action, such as local community
initiatives, informal religious charities or remittances
from disporas.
The second problem that underpins debates around
humanitarianism is a lack of common understanding
about the ultimate operating principles and the legitim-
acy of humanitarian organizations. As shown by multi-
country empirical data (Donini et al., 2008), there is
agreement over the existence of a common core of uni-
versal humanitarian values, but their interpretation
varies between communities. Practically, this leads to
the observation that ‘there is no situation where hu-
manitarian action is totally principled and allowed to
operate as such’ (Donini et al., 2008). Similarly, most
members of the humanitarian movement operate in a
lackofclarityaboutthesourcesoftheirlegitimacy.
1This
contributes to a number of problematic situations, for
example: misperceptions, concerns over the ‘humani-
tarian space’, controversies about speciﬁc humanitarian
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suffering among humanitarian workers.
From qualitative multi-country data collected over a
range of distinct community settings where Me ´decins
Sans Frontie `res (MSF) intervenes, Abu-Sada (2011)
showed recurrent and fundamental misperceptions by
recipients of aid, over the humanitarian organization
itself, its values and aims, humanitarian principles and
motives of humanitarian workers. In African settings,
many respondents interpreted humanitarian secular en-
deavours as expressions of religious values. Quality of
care was recognized as the main criterion for judging
MSF’swork.Suchobservationscallforadditionalefforts
of communication to attended communities, for im-
proved results-based accountability and for a reﬂective
inquiryovertheprecisevaluesthathumanitarianorgan-
izations represent.
The latter can also be implied from the ongoing
debate about the ‘humanitarian space’. Hubert and
Brassard-Boudreau (2010) allege that common state-
ments about the ‘shrinking’ of the humanitarian space
are misconceived and largely unfounded. In their ana-
lysis, however, they examine threats to humanitarian
access, to the respect for International Humanitarian
Law, or to the safety of humanitarian workers. These
threats can result from blurred boundaries between
traditional humanitarian relief, military operations
and integrated UN missions, all elements shaping the
current humanitarian landscape and which expose in
some way how the legitimacy of humanitarian organ-
izations is open to multiple interpretations.
Speciﬁc categories of humanitarian actions are not
immune to objections either. For example, some scho-
lars like anthropologists Bernard Hours (1998a,b) and
Miriam Ticktin (2006), extend their criticism of hu-
manitarianism to medical actions themselves, putting
forward two sets of arguments: political and moral.
First, medical interventions are instrumental to broader
political interests or to the globalization of Western
values, and their actors are oblivious of the rootpolitical
causes of conﬂicts and catastrophes. Second, humani-
tarian medicine, especially through its representations,
entertains an undigniﬁed and asymmetrical relationship
towardsthe‘victims’thatitpretendstorescue.Thereare
also more speciﬁc debates raised by humanitarian medi-
cine under particular operational circumstances, ques-
tioning the merits of medical practices, health systems
interferences or engagement in global health policies. In
such cases, the challenge can be variably addressed to
humanitarian medicine in general, to a speciﬁc organ-
ization, to a speciﬁc project or action or to the means
used to achieve an otherwise legitimate project.
Hurst et al. (2009) link the problem of fair resource
allocation in humanitarian medicine to the issue of le-
gitimacy, and call for further exploration of the topic.
Finally, there is a moral obligation of ideological clar-
ity for humanitarian organizations, towards the relief
workers whom they employ and whom they expose to
emotional traumas. This was analysed on theoretical
moral grounds by Slim (1997) as the ‘by-stander anx-
iety’, affecting members of non-governmental organiza-
tions(NGOs)whooperateasthirdpartiesinthecontext
of war zones. More recently, empirical data have been
produced to conﬁrm sources of moral suffering in hu-
manitarian workers, and to expose in particular how
moral tensions are created by policies, agendas and de-
cisions over resources allocation by aid agencies
(Schwartz et al., 2010).
Methodology
I have so far put forward a number of morally and op-
erationally relevant reasons for humanitarian organiza-
tions to clarify not only their fundamental values, but in
a broader sense, their legitimacy. At this point, an im-
portantdistinctionshouldbemadebetweenhumanitar-
ian interventions and other forms of humanitarian
actions. Humanitarian intervention is deﬁned by strat-
egists as one kind of military intervention.
2 The legitim-
acy of humanitarian intervention has been aptly
examined through political theory (see for example,
Kahler, 2011). In contrast, the legitimacy of other cate-
goriesof humanitarian actions (qualiﬁedas‘aid’,‘assist-
ance’ or ‘relief’), including the activities of mainstream
humanitarianism, is much more complex to deﬁne and
has seldom been addressed as such. For most humani-
tarian organizations, their legitimacy relies on informal
sources, variablyexpressed orinterpreted within the hu-
manitarian movement. Consequently, it is utterly difﬁ-
cult to distinguish between normative and descriptive
sources of legitimacy for humanitarian organizations,
and I will not make such an attempt. Instead, my ap-
proach is inductive. I start with a description of possible
sources of legitimacy for MSF, one among prominent
examples of a medical humanitarian organization
(Box 1). I examine what the organization, its members
or observers have to say about sources of MSF’s legit-
imacy, and what problems such pronouncements can
elicit or reveal. In order to map sources and boundaries
of MSF’s legitimacy, I apply an analytical framework
deﬁned by Hugo Slim (2002) in a review pertaining to
NGOsingeneral.FromthecaseofMSF,Itrytoseewhat
generalizable sources of legitimacy (if any) could be
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professional legitimacy of individual practitioners of
humanitarian medicine, a topic that would raise separ-
ate but undoubtedly relevant issues of accreditation, in-
tegrity and conduct. Instead, I am addressing here the
broader question of what sort of legitimacy grounds the
practice of humanitarian medicine as a collective
endeavour.
Since different understandings of humanitarian
medicine obviously could lead to different legitimacy
claims, I start with a proposal for a normative deﬁnition
of humanitarian medicine. I next examine how MSF has
characterizeditsownlegitimacy as‘informal’.Following
Slim’sfootsteps,Ithenconsiderfromabroaderperspec-
tive how the legitimacy of humanitarian medical organ-
izations pertains to international law and moral
principles. I next explore what kind of tangible actions
and support can generate an informal legitimacy.
Finally, I discuss some aspects of intangible sources of
legitimacy.
What is Humanitarian Medicine?
The diversity of deﬁnitions of humanitarian medicine
reﬂects at least three parallel trends. First, there is a
tendency for health sciences to capture humanitarian
medicine as a new academic discipline, in the same
constructionist way asglobalhealth orhealthdiplomacy
theories are injecting fresh blood into the obsolescing
domain of ‘international health’. Second, there is fre-
quent misappropriation of the expression ‘humanitar-
ian medicine’, which appeals to all sorts of enterprises,
whethergenuinelyhumanitarian,orsimplyfor-proﬁtor
linked to political goals. Partnerships between humani-
tarian actors and private sector companies are being
encouraged under United Nations initiatives (World
Economic Forum and OCHA, 2007) and we can prob-
ablyseetimes ahead,whennewbrandsof ‘humanitarian
medicine’ will be offered under the label of corporate
socialresponsibility(Hopgood,2008).Third,recenthis-
tory has seen a remarkable broadening of the scope of
health projects undertaken by mainstream humanitar-
ianactors,wellbeyondtheirinitialremitofdisastersand
armed conﬂicts. The typology of MSF activities during
recent years illustrates the growing variety of activities
ﬁnding rationale under the heading of ‘humanitarian
medicine’.
The political dimension of humanitarian medicine is
not foreign to such evolution either. Interestingly,
Andrew Lakoff (2010) describes two new regimes of
global health, grounded in quite distinct values and
worldviews: global health security and humanitarian
biomedicine. The apparent coherence between the two
regimes reveals a rather unhealthy marriage between
Box 1. Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res at a glance
The historical roots of MSF have been frequently recounted (Benthall, 2010; Fox, 1995; Valaeys, 2004; Redﬁeld,
2005).MSFwascreatedin1971byFrenchdoctorsandjournalists,outofideologicaldiscontentwiththepracticeof
political silence by the Red Cross Movement during the civil war in Nigeria. MSF’s original ideals have been
perpetuated through a constant emphasis on the dual principles of medical action and ‘te ´moignage’.
a MSF is also a
movement ruled by an associative type of governance reproduced over 19 national associations. Values and
principles of the organization have been expressed through successive self-referring documents (Me ´decins Sans
Frontie `res, 1971, 1995, 2006); a foundational Charter (1971), the ‘Chantilly Principles’ (1996) and the ‘La Mancha
Agreement’ (2006). Although MSF’s scope of activities is still dominated by emergency relief, the organization has
ventured into a broader range of medical interventions, navigating within the expanding boundaries of ‘crisis’
landscapes, between acute disasters, conﬂicts, neglected diseases (Balasegaram et al., 2006) and underserved popu-
lations. MSF was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. The prize money was used to create MSF’s Campaign for
Access to Essential Medicines, opening a wider dimension to advocacy and a deeper engagement in debates over
global health policies (Redﬁeld, 2008).
Attributes discussed for MSF in this article are not necessarily applicable to other medical humanitarian organ-
izations claiming international outreach. Beside its prominence in the medical sector, MSF’s most distinct features
are: (i) a reference to the ‘Dunantist’ tradition, (ii) an associative mode of governance and (iii) an emphasis on
‘te ´moignage’.
aGenerallytranslatedas‘bearingwitness’or‘testimony’.Noneofthosetermsconveyaclearsensethat‘te ´moignage’
should also be a self-effacing attempt to give voice to victims.
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biomedicine could be seen as offering a philanthropic
palliative to nation-states lacking public health infra-
structure in exchange for the right of international
health organizations to monitor their populations for
outbreaks that might threaten wealthy nations’.
Beyond this particular case of outbreak detection, the
practice of humanitarian medicine often lies at the
center of a triangle linking health, foreign policy and
security, where the apparent neutrality of health is
being instrumentalized as a soft power (Ingram, 2005:
534) to further national interests more broadly.
Altogether, such trends contribute to expanding the
nebula of ‘humanitarian medicine’ and, worryingly, to
the risk to lose its identity as an essentially altruistic act.
There is thus a need for a more cohesive deﬁnition of
humanitarian medicine.
It is clear that the scope of humanitarian medicine
cannot be deﬁned under a coherent set of speciﬁc prac-
tices (e.g. emergency medicine, public health, tropical
medicine, disaster medicine). Likewise, it cannot be
deﬁned only by circumstances (e.g. refugee camps, con-
ﬂict zones, natural disasters), nor by speciﬁc categories
of‘beneﬁciaries’(e.g.prisoners,migrants).Noneofsuch
operational deﬁnitions would capture the full scope and
essence of humanitarian medicine. Neither would they
contribute to solving legitimacy issues. The key point is
that humanitarian medicine can only be deﬁned
through its moral underpinnings. Tentatively, it could
be described as:
a set of medical or public health practices whose
sole intent is to selﬂessly accommodate and ad-
dress the tension created between compelling
health needs and the ongoing deprivation of re-
sources in a given population or community.
Such a deﬁnition, based on the moral intents of those
who practice humanitarian medicine would encompass
the range of activities generally recognized as legitimate
humanitarian action (including responses to public
health disasters and chronic crises), and at the same
time, avoid co-optation for political, security or private
purposes.
The deﬁnition also implies that moral tension is con-
stitutiveofthepracticeofhumanitarianmedicine,inthe
sense that the latter entails an almost constant confron-
tation to the unfair allocation of resources, viewed from
a global perspective. In other terms, medicine ceases to
be humanitarian in essence, when the needs are fulﬁlled
through resolution of the sources of deprivation, or
when the needs are not compelling.
3
An example can perhaps illustrate the boundaries of
humanitarian medicine, in light of the deﬁnition. Let us
consider cardiac paediatric surgery performed by ex-
patriate specialists in a state-of-the-art hospital estab-
lished through international philanthropy in the capital
ofalow-incomecountry.Here,theneedsmightbecom-
pelling (e.g. if the hospital recruits most children of the
country suffering from congenital or rheumatic heart
disease), but the practice does not entail any exceptional
tension.Expatriatesurgeonswouldencounteraworking
environment thatisnot anydifferent fromtheirfamiliar
ones in industrialized countries. More importantly, they
could avoid—if they wish—being confronted directly to
the circumstances of deprivation that make rheumatic
heart disease still prevalent in the country. This would
be a case of generosity and altruism if expatriate person-
nel were giving some of their salary and free time to the
project, but not a case of practicing humanitarian medi-
cine. The claim of humanitarian medicine could, how-
ever, be made by the health care workers routinely
attending the same patients in their living circum-
stances, and acting with professionalism through
adapted medical practices. These health workers
would encounter very different moral dilemmas from
the expatriate surgeon in the capital, for example the
need to balanceresources between prevention and treat-
ment ofrheumatic heartdisease, or the triage of patients
to be sent to the capital for surgery.
The proposed deﬁnition is a unifying one in the sense
that it relies on an uncontroversial and universal moral
reason for practicing humanitarian medicine. It is of the
same qualitative order as the ‘ethic of refusal’ eloquently
spelled out by James Orbinski when delivering the 1999
NobelLecture,andfurtherdiscussedbyRedﬁeld(2005).
The moral tension implied in the proposed deﬁnition
lies at a mid-level in the chain of moral reasons, between
higher principles of moral philosophy and professional
codes of ethics. In other terms, it does not make any
assumption about the ultimate moral values endorsed
by individuals accepting or seeking to work under con-
ditions where such extreme tensions between needs and
means exist. The range of ultimate moral reasons is ex-
pected to be diverse between individual humanitarian
workers and, as we will see later, it is multiple between
organizations.Byputtingemphasisonmoralreasonsfor
humanitarian engagement, I am not ignoring the fact
that relief workers can have other or additional motiv-
ations to embrace humanitarian actions.
4 Such motiv-
ations could include, e.g. opportunities for professional
development, or an escape from the legitimacy crisis of
the liberal medical profession in Europe since the 1970s
(Givoni, 2011). The role of organizations is simply to
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humanitarian medicine. A ﬁrst source of legitimacy
for medical humanitarian organizations thus relies on
their capacity to enact and support in a collective way a
morally principled deﬁnition of humanitarian medi-
cine. A second source of moral legitimacy, as I will dis-
cuss later is a universalist view of distributive justice and
collective responsibility.
My deﬁnition of humanitarian medicine is encom-
passing since it can accommodate all sorts of endeav-
ours, from individual initiatives to multinational
alliances.
5 At the same time, it is restrictive through its
moral perspective. For example, it would exclude as le-
gitimate medical humanitarian initiatives any organized
attempts to subvert medical care toward other goals,
such as: collecting intelligence or anthropological data
about populations, winning hearts and minds for polit-
ical or military achievements, increasing the acceptance
of environmentally adverse extractive industries or pro-
moting religious beliefs. Such goals could perhaps be
seen as legitimate or useful from different perspectives,
but not as a humanitarian one. The legitimacy of hu-
manitarian medicine is thus simply grounded in collect-
ive moral intents and values. Within this framework,
organizations display distinct additional values, operat-
ing principles or records of excellence that contribute to
build up additional sources of legitimacy. At this point,
I will now proceed by analysing what additional sources
of legitimacy apply to medical humanitarian organiza-
tions, and how MSF makes claims about it.
MSF and the ‘New Informal
Legitimacy’
The implicit understanding of ‘legitimacy’ which has so
far shored up this discussion has no bearing to strictly
legal concepts (e.g. constitutional legitimacy). Instead,
the kind of legitimacy which is frequently referred to in
the humanitarian literature appeals more to feelings of
‘natural rights’ or ‘rightfulness of action’. With an inter-
national mandate based on international humanitarian
law, the International Committee of the Red Cross
stands out as an exception to this general lack of clarity
over the legitimacy of humanitarian organizations.
For MSF, legitimacy itself is not mentioned in the
foundational documents. Instead it appears recurrently
in the 1999 Nobel Lecture (Orbinski, 1999). James
Orbinski declared for example that:
MSFisnotaformalinstitution,andwithanyluck
at all, it never will be. It is a civil society
organization, and today civil society has a new
global role, a new informal legitimacy that is
rooted in its action and in its support from
public opinion.
This statement conﬁrms that MSF’s legitimacy does
not necessarily ﬁt within traditional frameworks of gov-
ernance (it is ‘new’ and ‘informal’), and it brings up two
important determinants of this new sort of legitimacy:
‘action’ and ‘public opinion’. However, it does not say
what type of ‘action’ automatically would confer legit-
imacy. It does not elaborate either on who is the legit-
imizing ‘public opinion’, an important point to reﬂect
upon for an organization with international outreach.
In his work on accountability of NGOs, Hugo Slim
(2002) offers a more detailed account of the multiple
dimensions of this new informal legitimacy. Slim’s
framework
6 implies that an NGOs legitimacy ‘...is
both derived and generated. It is derived from morality
and law. It isgenerated by veracity, tangible support and
more intangible goodwill’.
The importance given to generated sources (the pro-
cesses or output of humanitarian actions that are open
to scrutiny) implies that legitimacy is not a granted at-
tribute, but one that can be challenged at any time, and
one that needs constant contributions to perpetuate
itself.
Henceforth, in light of Slim’s multi-dimensional
framework, I will ﬁrst examine sources of legitimacy
for ‘Dunantist’ organizations in general and MSF as a
medical organization in particular. The analytical
framework considers successively: sources derived
from law, sources derived from moral values, generated
sources and intangible sources.
International Law
International human rights law, international humani-
tarian law (IHL), and refugee law are frequently men-
tioned, often inappropriately, as underlying the
legitimacy of humanitarian organizations.
International Humanitarian Law
As noted earlier, the mandate to oversee the application
of IHLstrictlyapplies tothe International Committee of
the Red Cross. For other organizations, the relationship
with IHL is much looser. Mackintosh (2000) observes
that: ‘The Geneva Conventions do not confer rights or
impose obligations upon humanitarian agencies. The
Conventions simply do not address these actors’.
Medical organizations frequently operate in conﬂict
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medical organization like MSF naturally abides by con-
ditions speciﬁed in IHL. It gains additional operational
space and access to populations in need, from the re-
spect of IHL by combatants (Mackintosh, 2000). In
other terms, legality contributes to the legitimacy of
NGOs (Slim, 2002), but legitimacy is a much broader
multi-disciplinary concept encompassing different
principles (Kolı ´n, 2007). The Red Cross principles of
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
(Leader, 1998) are naturally endorsed by MSF
7 and
other non-governmental ‘Dunantist’ organizations.
However, adherence to humanitarian principles has an
instrumental, rather than intrinsic value for NGOs. The
same can be said for the ICRC, for whom traditional
principles are a means to the end of assisting victims of
conﬂict, and not ends in themselves (Hubert and
Brassard-Boudreau, 2010). Furthermore, references to
international law, as used by most NGOs, conceal in
reality, implicit and unclear statements about moral
values. For example, justiﬁcations for humanitarian ac-
tions, based on the versatile principle of ‘neutrality’
illustrate the complexity of the humanitarian language
(Leaning, 2007).
Finally, the recent misappropriation of IHL as a jus-
tiﬁcation for armed interventions in the name of ‘re-
sponsibility to protect’ makes it even more important
for NGOs to remind that IHL does not fundamentally
ground the legitimacy of their actions. As Weissman
(2010) puts it: ‘Arguments that link (responsibility to
protect) and the concept of a “just war” draw on the
same sources of moral and legal legitimacy as humani-
tarian action’. The misperception of IHL and humani-
tarian organizations as instruments of state interference
could be further aggravated by ongoing attempts to
expand the scope of protections authorized under
IHL, to add natural disasters (including epidemics)
within the purview of the ‘right to humanitarian assist-
ance’ (Davies, 2010), and to allow forceful foreign inter-
ventions in such cases. The distinction between
humanitarian intervention (Kahler, 2011) and humani-
tarian assistance is particularly crucial here.
International Human Rights Law
On the other hand, the frequent confusion over the le-
gitimacy of international medical NGOs and interna-
tional human rights law has several sources. First,
several NGOs have the explicit purpose to promote
human rights (especially political rights). They use ad-
vocacy channels or strategies similar to medical NGOs,
although the nature and purpose of advocacy messages
are different in both cases. Second, members of medical
NGOs happen to witness in their practice the conse-
quences of abuses of human rights, through their pres-
ence among affected communities or sometimes
through direct medical observations (Robertson et al.,
2002). This raises the central question of whether such
NGOs can claim legitimacy of their medical actions
through reference to international human rights law,
and eventually make pronouncements to denounce vio-
lations of the right to health or other human rights. The
matter is further complicated by several misinterpret-
ations, for example, explicit references to human rights
in MSF’s foundational documents
8 or policy statements
and by frequent mentions of MSF’s defence of human
rights in the academic literature.
9 Commenting on the
debate over human rights and humanitarian action,
Rony Brauman (2007) and James Darcy (2007) urge
cautionovertheversatilityofthehumanrightsdoctrine,
and over the conﬂation of civil and political rights on
one hand, and social rights (including health) on the
other hand. Fundamentally, the mandate to enact the
International Bill of Human Rights applies to signatory
State Parties, not to NGOs. But taking some human
rights as symbolic statements of universal values rather
than legally binding prescriptions, could we say for a
moment that the right to life
10 or the right to health
11
translate into obligations for medical NGOs? Brauman’s
and Darcy’s analyses would suggest that this is not the
case, when they appeal to ‘needs-based’ or ‘duty-based’
approaches, instead of ‘rights-based approaches’. Such a
position, inspired by political or legal considerations,
implies also an important moral derivation. It shifts
the claim for humanitarian assistance from the victim
to the rescuer’s ground. If what counts in humanitarian
action are not victims expressing their rights, but res-
cuers responding to needs or exercising their duties,
who has legitimacy to assess needs or decide upon
one’s duty?
Moral Legitimacy
The latter question brings up one aspect of a broader
and crucial debate over moral values in humanitarian
medicine, i.e. the problem of choices. Making rightful
choices (over resources allocation for example) greatly
contributes to the legitimacy of one organization, but
the moral criteria for choices are utterly complex and
variable, and they should not necessarily rely on the
human rights doctrine (manuscript in preparation).
Depending on circumstances and levels of decision, cri-
teria can have different weights, and can include appeals
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guments or utilitarian principles. Such important con-
siderations will be discussed elsewhere. What we need at
this stage is a more encompassing criterion of moral
legitimacy for humanitarian medicine, seen as part of
a movement, and regardless of how choices are actually
made.
As a recognized movement, humanitarian medicine
has become part of a post-Westphalian model of health
governance, whereby states are just one category among
multiple actors who all have some degree of legitimacy
in both inter- and intra-state governance (Stevenson
and Cooper, 2009). For medical NGOs, this sort of le-
gitimacy is more about political relevance on the global
arena than the genuine recognition of their capacity to
act morally. However, aside from political relevance, the
merit of humanitarianism as a movement (and one of
the sources of its legitimacy), is precisely its cosmopol-
itan outreach and its capacity to deploy means to in-
crease the proximity between victims and relief workers.
In doing so, individual organizations converge on a
(often implicit) claim for a universalist view of distribu-
tive justice and collective responsibility. For example,
despite a lack of clarity over any system of moral
values, notions of global distributive justice pervade
MSF’s stances and policies. This ﬁnds expressions in
its systematic enterprise to facilitate universal access to
essential drugs and diagnostic tools,
12 in efforts to pri-
oritize the worst off or ‘the most vulnerable’,
13 and in a
sense of collective responsibility or ‘common humanity’
embodied under the ‘Sans Frontie `res’ rallying call for
medical action.
To the extent that MSF is representative of the
humanitarian movement, an important and unifying
source of moral legitimacy for medical humanitarian
organizations is thus a universalist view of distributive
justice and collective responsibility, enacted through
cosmopolitan outreach. Depending on its allegiance,
each organization can thereupon spell out additional
and particular sources of legitimacy, or moral principles
whereby, it will exercise its fair choices and collective
responsibilities. For example, faith-based organizations
would appeal to their own traditions of charity. Other
organizations would rather make more explicit refer-
ences to solidarity or compassion (Perkin, 2006).
Generated and Tangible Sources of Legitimacy
While collective moral principles constitute the back-
bone of the ‘new informal’ legitimacy claimed by MSF,
generated sources constitute its living and evolving ex-
pressions. In that sense, the sources of legitimacy
summarized in Box 2 constitute at the same time, a
roadmap for humanitarian medicine and a set of indi-
cators of how medical humanitarian actions are ac-
countable outside of their respective organizations.
The‘tangiblesupport’and‘tangibleperformance’cri-
teria of Hugo Slim apply to all NGOs in general, but
differ according to each organization’s spirit or speciﬁc
endeavours. For example, MSF International is one
among the 185 NGOs in ofﬁcial relations with the
World Health Organization (WHO, 2010). An associa-
tive mode of governance is also a tangible source of le-
gitimacy, which is generated by the extent of
participation from members and the openness of deci-
sional procedures.
Humanitarian medicine standards and practice rely
on a disparate corpus of knowledge, drawing from
public health, tropical medicine and other disciplines.
It is a ﬁeld requiring experience, integrity and cross-
cultural approaches. It is typically practiced as a team
effort, involving health professionals with a wide range
of educational backgrounds and experiences. Tangible
professional relationships, knowledge and expertise
imply partnerships with health sciences schools,
proper accreditation of health professionals and a com-
mitment to share accruing knowledge. Operational re-
search and academic publications are integral parts of
the practice of humanitarian medicine (Zachariah et al.,
2009, 2010), and the conduct of research in emergency
contexts needs to obey adapted ethical principles
(Pringle and Cole, 2009). The external sharing of know-
ledge collected during ﬁeld practice (notably clinical ex-
perience under precarious situations) is an important
and visible expression of legitimacy, and a testimony
tothecollectiveanduniversalcharacterofhumanitarian
medicine.
Intangible Sources of Legitimacy
Intangible sources of legitimacy, such as trust, integrity,
reputation and personal relationships are particularly
important for medical humanitarian organizations
operating in diverse socio-cultural contexts. The way
some humanitarian organizations have gained legitim-
acy towards North Korean authorities is a conspicuous
example (Yim et al., 2009). Such sources of legitimacy
are intangible only to the extent that efforts are not
made to formally explore opinions and perceptions of
residents of territories where humanitarian medicine
takes place. Such explorations are however feasible (es-
sentially through qualitative surveys), and they can im-
prove the quality of aid programmes and the legitimacy
of the humanitarian enterprise by putting patients and
62  CALAINcommunities on a more equal ground with those who
strive to help them. Perceptions surveys carried out by
MSF in 10 countries among a wide range of respondents
(Abu-Sada, 2011) are of particular interest to identify
intangible sources of legitimacy, and to correct misper-
ceptions from both sides of the humanitarian mirror.
Conclusions
Deﬁning the legitimacy of humanitarian action is com-
plex and probably cannot be accommodated within
simple normative criteria. Taking MSF as a case in
point, several conclusions can be extended to humani-
tarian medicine in general. First, there should be a
common agreement on what is the scope of actions
that can be called ‘humanitarian’, and their underlying
values. I have limited my demonstration to the realm of
humanitarian medicine, leaving aside other disciplines
that equally contribute to humanitarian action. My def-
inition of humanitarian medicine is based on the selﬂess
intention of individual humanitarian actors, and pre-
cludes any subversion of medical practice towards
derived interests. Similar deﬁnitions could probably be
proposed for other types of humanitarianism based on
service provision. Second, neither international law, nor
the humanitarian principles are sufﬁcient to legitimize
the actions of NGOs (aside from the Red Cross
movement itself). Third, a moral principle common
to medical humanitarian organizations appears to be
their explicit or implicit commitment to universal dis-
tributive justice. This leaves it open for individual or-
ganizations to rely on additional and distinct moral
principles, notably to ground the allocation of their re-
sources. Fourth, the sort of informal legitimacy that hu-
manitarian organizations can claim is mostly generated
bytheiractions,whichshouldbesuccessful,accountable
and professional. This is what allows them to operate
with consent from the people whom they attend, and
outside of any formal mandate. Informal legitimacy is
not a granted attribute, but an ongoing, perfectible and
challengeable process. An enumeration of generated
sources of legitimacy is thus a roadmap for elevation
in this process.
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1. I leave the deﬁnitions of ‘legitimate’ and ‘legitimacy’
open at this stage, appealing provisionally to the
common intuitions that these words can elicit for
readers.
2. For example, Kolı ´n (2007) discusses the legitimacy
of humanitarian interventions in terms of Aquinas’s
moral theory of ‘just war’.
3. Resolution of the sources of deprivation would lead
to a transition toward a development agenda. One
example of non-compelling needs would be a cos-
metic surgery clinic set up in the middle of a
deprived area, in response to demands from a mi-
nority of well-off families.
4. As Donini (2010) points out, ‘a thorough socio-
logical research study of the motivations of aid
workers has yet to be conducted’. Fox (1995) and
Herzlich (1995) allude summarily to motivations as
a mix of personal, altruistic and professional
reasons.
5. For example, the practice of a Somali doctor or
nurse declining offers for professional promotion
overseas, and choosing instead to serve selﬂessly
and with limited resources, a community in her
own country should not be less recognized as ‘hu-
manitarian medicine’ than the transient work of an
expatriate European practitioner working in the
same country under the aegis of a recognized inter-
national NGO.
6. Hugo Slim expands the framework from his deﬁn-
ition of legitimacy as: ‘the particular status with
which an organisation is imbued and perceived at
any given time that enables it to operate with the
generalconsentofpeoples,governments,companies
and non-state groups around the world’. Although
we might disagree on the proposed range of con-
senting stakeholders, the framework brings clarity
over various understandings of ‘legitimacy’ ex-
pressed in the humanitarian literature.
7. This appears most explicitly in the Chantilly
Principles. Oddly, the MSF Charter endorses neu-
trality and impartiality ‘in the name of universal
medical ethics’.
8. Under the fourth principle enunciated in the
Chantilly Document, MSF:
ascribes to the principles of Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law’, including
‘the duty to respect the fundamental rights
and freedoms of each individuals, including
the right to physical and mental integrity and
the freedom of thought and movement, as out-
lined in the 1949 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
Paragraph 1.13 of the La Mancha Agreement is more
cautious:
MSF actions coincide with some of the goals of
human rights organisations; however, our goal is
medical-humanitarian action rather than the
promotion of such rights.
9. See for example, Fox (1995), Hours (1998a,b),
Lakoff (2010) and Annas (2010).
10. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948).
11. Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
12. This is precisely the mandate given by MSF to the
Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines.
13. Article 1.1 of the La Mancha Agreement.
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